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Articles

Consumer Bankruptcy: A Proposal to
Reform Chapters 7 and 13 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code
Charles M. Foster* & Stephen L. Poe**
I.

Introduction

Although the U.S. economy has enjoyed a period of steady
growth for the past seven years, personal bankruptcies continue to
rise.1 In 1998, a record 1.44 million bankruptcy petitions were filed,

a near three percent increase over those filed in 1997, a fifteen
percent increase over those filed in 1996, and a forty percent
increase over those filed in 1995.2 More than ninety-five percent of
these petitions were filed by individuals, with about eighty percent
of the filings in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13. The number of personal
Associate Professor of Business Law, University of North Texas.
Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of North Texas.
1. Julie Kosterlitz, Over the Edge, 29 NAT'L L.J. 870 (1997).
2. See Jennifer Corbett Dooren, Bankruptcy Filings Hit Record, But Business
Fail Rate Slows, S.F. EXAM'R, Mar. 2, 1999, at B-3; Visa USA Sees Personal
Bankruptcies Headed for a Record in '98, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, July 20, 1998,
at 47.
3. The Increase in PersonalBankruptcy and Consumer Credit Crisis: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. On Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the Senate
*

**
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bankruptcies forecast for 2001 is more than 2.2 million, which is
almost four times the number a decade ago. Accompanying this
rise in personal bankruptcies has been a staggering increase in the
amount of losses incurred by consumer creditors, particularly credit
card issuers. For example, in 1995 losses sustained by issuers
increased forty-five percent to 4.7 billion dollars.4
As losses to lenders have steadily risen, the consumer credit
industry has continued to request that Congress take action to
reform the bankruptcy laws to insure that consumer debtors make
more of an effort to repay their obligations in the bankruptcy
process. Over the past five years, a number of actions have been
taken to accommodate these requests.
In 1994, Congress
established the National Bankruptcy Review Commission (NBRC)
to review the existing bankruptcy laws, evaluate the operation of
the bankruptcy system, and propose changes to enhance the
efficiency and fairness of the system. In 1997, the NBRC issued its
report to Congress, joining a variety of reform proposals already
circulated by the consumer credit industry and other interested
parties. Most recently, in the spring of 1999, the House of
Representatives passed a bill5 designed to address creditor concerns
by significantly reforming the consumer bankruptcy process. The
purposes of this paper are to provide an overview of the consumer
bankruptcy system, explore the legal, social and economic factors
that have contributed to the boom in consumer bankruptcy filings,
and discuss the various reform proposals advocated by the NBRC.
the consumer credit industry, and those currently being considered
by Congress. The article concludes with the authors' own reform
proposal, which is an attempt to address the concerns and unite the
interests of both consumer advocates and creditors.
II.

Overview of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 Proceedings

The framers of the Constitution had English bankruptcy laws
in mind when they gave Congress the power to enact "uniform laws

Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. 138 (1997) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of
American Bankruptcy Institute).
4. Kosterlitz, supra note 1, at 870. As one commentator has noted, however,
these loss figures are most likely overstated. "The bankruptcy process itself should
be blamed only for the marginal losses that occur because of the availability of the
bankruptcy option. The figures include all the losses resulting from those filings,
many of which would occur even without the availability of bankruptcy." Vern
McKinley, Ballooning Bankruptcies: Issuing Blame for the Explosive Growth, 20
REGULATION 33, 37 (1997).
5. See H.R. 833,106th Cong. (1999)
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on the subject of bankruptcies."6 At that time, the English
bankruptcy system was extremely pro-creditor and very harsh on
debtors, who were considered virtually as criminals. Only creditors
could initiate bankruptcy proceedings, the primary purpose of
which was to facilitate collection and repayment of debts.' Any
attempt by a debtor to prevent creditors from collecting debts was
considered an act of bankruptcy, 9 enabling creditors to petition the
Chancellor to seize, appraise and sell the debtor's assets, and then
distribute the proceeds pro rata to creditors similar to
No debtor discharge
contemporary liquidation proceedings."
provisions existed in the earliest bankruptcy laws, so creditors were
able after bankruptcy to initiate further attempts to collect from the
debtor."
Today, the U.S. bankruptcy system attempts to balance the
needs of creditors and debtors. 2 The system eschews simple
punishment in favor of blending two all-American values: personal
responsibility and the availability of a second chance. 3 In theory
anyway a goal of the system is to encourage debtors to quickly
become productive members of society.
Consumer debtors seeking relief from their creditors
essentially have a choice between two alternative procedures under
Title 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Under Chapter 7, the debtor
surrenders all non-exempt assets 4 in which he still has equity to a
trustee, who then liquidates the property and distributes the
proceeds to creditors in accordance with their respective priorities
under bankruptcy law. 5 In the event the debtor acts honestly, fully
discloses requested information about his assets and financial
affairs, and otherwise cooperates with the trustee and the
bankruptcy court, the debtor usually will receive a general
discharge which will release him from any remaining personal
liability for his dischargeable debts, whether fully paid in the

6.

Charles J. Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3

AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 6 (1995).

7. See id. at 7.
8. See id. at 8.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See Tabb supra note 6, at 8.
12. See Kosterlitz, supra note 1, at 870.
13. See id.
14. "Exempt assets" refers to property of the debtor that the Bankruptcy
Code excludes from the bankruptcy estate and the reach of the debtor's creditors.
See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1994).
15. See id.
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bankruptcy proceeding or not. About seventy percent of individual
debtors file Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
Alternatively, a debtor who has a regular income with
unsecured debts not exceeding $250,000 and secured debts not
exceeding $750,000 can initiate a proceeding under Chapter 13 of
the Bankruptcy Code. In Chapter 13, the debtor proposes a plan to
repay his debts, typically over a three- to five-year period, which
then must be confirmed by the court to be effective. Once the plan
is confirmed, the debtor must fund the payments required by the
plan, which is typically carried out by the debtor surrendering his
future monthly disposable income over the period of the plan to a
court-appointed trustee, who then makes the payments required by
the plan.1 6 To encourage the debtor to make this effort to repay his
debts, Chapter 13 permits him to keep both his exempt and nonexempt assets.17 Also, once all of the payments under the plan have
been made, the debtor is entitled to receive a discharge that
releases him from many debts that would be non-dischargeable
under Chapter 7.
The purpose of Chapter 7 is to provide a fresh start to the
debtor. The debtor may lose his non-exempt assets, but is entitled
to keep as exempt property much of the equity in his homestead,
his automobile, household furnishings, and the tools of his trade, as
well as all of his future earnings and amounts in a qualified pension
or retirement fund.18 Also, upon discharge he will be released from
most of his debts, whether or not they have been paid in full.
Although secured creditors may be repaid from their collateral,
unsecured creditors are generally paid on a pro-rata basis to the
extent proceeds, if any, are realized from the sale of the debtor's
non-exempt assets. Since most assets of many debtors will either be
collateral claimed by secured creditors or exempt assets claimed by
the debtor, often there are very few assets left to be liquidated for
the benefit of the unsecured creditors.
The purpose of Chapter 13, on the other hand, is to provide an
opportunity for the debtor to restructure his debts over an extended
period of time while maintaining possession of most of his assets.
Unsecured creditors usually expect to realize more from a Chapter
13 proceeding, since the source of repayment is not a fixed pool of
assets but portions of the debtor's future earnings. Also, to be
confirmed, the plan must pay the unsecured creditors (at a
16. See id. § 1322(a)(1).
17. See id. § 1327(b).
18. See id. § 522.
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minimum) the same percentage recovery that they would have
realized under Chapter 7 and represent a good faith effort by the
debtor to repay his debts. Chapter 13 typically appeals to debtors
with regular income and assets in excess of state law exemptions.
III. Legal, Social & Economic Factors Contributing to the Boom
in Consumer Bankruptcy Filings
A.

The Bankruptcy Process

Creditors claim the bankruptcy process itself has become so
outdated and lenient that it cheats lenders and provides little
deterrent against reckless borrowing and spending by consumers."
A particularly ominous development to creditors has been the
"surprise" bankruptcy, debtors who file for bankruptcy without first
having a sustained period of delinquency."
This development,
according to creditors, has arisen due to the ease and simplicity of
the bankruptcy filing process.
1.
Substantial Abuse of Chapter 7 by Debtor-Claims are
made about the supposedly lax bankruptcy laws, but little
significant change has occurred in bankruptcy since 1978.21 Debtors
today can receive discharges in Chapter 7 without any examination
of their ability to repay, with the result that consumers not seriously
delinquent are filing.22 In the 1994 Bankruptcy Reform Act,23
Congress increased the debt levels allowed for debtors who wished
to file for Chapter 13, in the hope that more debtors would file for
Chapter 13. It does not appear, however, that any such increase has
occurred, since Chapter 13 filings are still only about 30% of all
consumer filings, about what they were prior to the 1994 Act.
Nearly three-fourths of debtors will opt for Chapter 7 over Chapter
13,2" although it is estimated that nearly half of those filing in
19. See Kosterlitz, supra note 1, at 870.
20. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 134 (statement of American Bankruptcy
Institute).
21. See Kosterlitz, supra note 1, at 870. In 1997, a Gallup poll asked individual
debtors filing for bankruptcy to list their major reasons for filing. According to the
poll respondents, major reasons included job loss or a cut in pay, large medical
bills, divorce, and credit card debt.
22. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 76 (statement of Donald B. Banks, Director
of Legal Services for Retailers National Bank Dayton Hudson Corporation).
23. Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 11 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C. (1994 & Supp. I. 1995)).
24. One commentator has offered the following explanation why consumers
prefer Chapter 7 over Chapter 13:
Mirroring the practices of creditors at the time, the bankruptcy code
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Chapter 7 could qualify for Chapter 13.25 Although debtors prefer
the stream-lined discharge and the fresh start available under
Chapter 7,26 most unsecured creditors stand a better chance of
getting repaid at least in part under Chapter 13, since under
Chapter 7 there is typically little left for them after liquidation 2of
7
the debtor's non-exempt assets and secured creditors are paid off.
Accordingly, credit card issuers and other unsecured creditors
maintain that debtors are abusing the Chapter 7 proceeding at
creditor expense,' and question the effectiveness of Section 707(b)
of the Bankruptcy Code. Enacted in 1984, Section 707(b) provides
that a bankruptcy court can dismiss a debtor's petition if the court
determines that granting relief would constitute "a substantial
abuse of the provisions" of Chapter 7.29 However, "substantial
abuse" is not defined by the Bankruptcy Code, the legislative
history is not instructive, and the courts are divided about its
meaning. For example, at least three U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal
have found that such abuse occurs when the debtor would have
been able to pay a substantial portion of his debts through a
Chapter 13 plan, while other courts have held that such ability is
only one factor to be considered in the "totality of the
circumstances 30 as to whether substantial abuse has occurred, and a
treated asset liquidation as the primary source of repayment capacity, an
approach that is apparent in the language of Chapter 7. The debtor was
allowed to keep certain exempt assets, but the price of the debtor's "fresh
start" was the liquidation of remaining, non-exempt assets to repay
creditors. Any remaining debts were discharged. Over time, the criteria
used to grant consumer credit shifted dramatically toward an evaluation
of capacity to repay out of future income. However, the code has not
changed with the times, leaving consumers the choice of filing under
either the asset liquidation chapter or the repayment chapter. Given the
change in the basis for obtaining credit, it is not surprising that at least 95
percent of debtors who filed under Chapter 7 in 1996 had no (nonexempt) assets to liquidate.
Hearings,supra note 3, at 10 (statement of Dr. Michael E.Staten, Director, Credit
Research Center, Krannert Graduate School of Management, Purdue University).

25. See Melynda D. Wilcox, The Months Ahead,

KIPLINGER'S PERSONAL

1997, at 13.
26. As currently structured, Chapter 7 protects most of the assets of most
debtors (either through exemption or reaffirmation), while discharging them of
most of their debts and preserving their future income from current creditors.
27. See Kosterlitz, supra note 1, at 870.
28. See id.
29. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1994).
30. See Brian Wildermuth, Note, In re Lee: Tithing as Grounds for Dismissal
Under Section 707(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 725, 729-30
(1995), and cases cited therein. The "totality of the circumstances" approach has
been found to require an evaluation of the following criteria:
(1) Whether the bankruptcy petition was filed because of sudden illness,
FINANCE MAGAZINE, May
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few courts have ruled that such ability constitutes substantial abuse
only if it involves some "egregious circumstance," "unfair
advantage" or "evidence of bad faith."'" Regardless of the type of
test articulated by the court, however, it appears that "a common
thread running through most of the cases dismissed for substantial
abuse is the existence of some ... misconduct, impropriety, or lack
of good faith on the part of the debtors," while substantial net
disposable incomes, in and of themselves, are insufficient to
establish substantial abuse.32
2. Reaffirmation Agreement-Questions also exist about the
appropriateness of reaffirmation agreements.
Creditors offer
debtors who are in the process of receiving a Chapter 7 discharge
an opportunity to "reaffirm" their debts in exchange for allowing
them to keep possession of collateral or the extension of credit,
including the issuance of a new credit card.3 Ordinarily in Chapter
7, the debtor surrenders his non-exempt property and any collateral
that has been pledged to secured creditors, in exchange for which
the debtor is discharged from having to pay the balance of most of
his debts. To the extent that the debtor desires to keep possession
of collateral - such as the debtor's car or home - the debtor usually
may be allowed to do so in exchange for agreeing to reaffirm the
debt. Such a reaffirmation agreement obligates the debtor to
continue making payments until the balance of the debt affirmed
has been paid in full, while the creditor agrees to refrain from
repossession and other remedies so long as payments are made. To

calamity, disability, or unemployment;
(2) Whether the debtor incurred cash advances and made consumer
purchases far in excess of his ability to repay;
(3) whether the debtor's proposed family budget is excessive or
unreasonable;
(4) Whether the petition was filed in good faith.
Id. (citing In re Green, 934 F.2d 568, 572 (4th Cir. 1991)).
31. See id. at 729-30.
32 Id. at 730, n.48 (citing In re Wegner, 91 B.R. 854, 857-58 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1988)).
33. As some have noted, however, there may be many valid reasons why a
debtor may want to repay some of his debts even though eligible to receive a
discharge. For example, reaffirmation may be consented to in order:
[T]o prevent loss to co-obligors or others with whom the debtor is in a
special relationship such as membership in a credit union or co-op; to
prevent loss to a related creditor; or to preserve or re-establish a
particular line of credit that the debtor values for its utility, whether the
debtor is a farmer that needs to buy seed and fertilizer or a homeowner
who needs to replace a water heater.
Hearings, supra note 3, at 76 (statement of Donald B. Banks, Director of Legal
Services for Retailers National Bank Dayton Hudson Corporation).
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protect this process from abuse, reaffirmation agreements are not
enforceable against consumer debtors unless certain procedural
requirements have been fulfilled, including the consent of the
bankruptcy court.
Despite these procedural requirements, consumer advocates
and other critics charge that the reaffirmation process has been
abused by creditors,34 who have unfairly pressured debtors to pay
debts that otherwise would be dischargeable in Chapter 7.35
Perhaps the best-known example of such abuse involves Sears,
Roebuck & Co. In June, 1997, as part of a settlement agreement
with the Federal Trade Commission, Sears agreed to pay up to $125
million to more than 200,000 bankrupt consumer debtors from
whom it had obtained reaffirmation agreements, and an additional
$140 million to settle related class action litigation brought by the
nation's state attorneys general. According to allegations in the
class-action suits, Sears pressured debtors to enter into these
agreements by threatening to repossess items it had previously sold
to the debtors, but then failed to obtain court approval of these
agreements. Since the reaffirmation agreements were invalid, Sears
effectively had been collecting debts that had been discharged in
the course of the bankruptcy proceeding. In addition to the civil
liability, Sears still may face criminal charges that may result from
an investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice.
Although the practice is legal where an attorney or the
bankruptcy court approves, critics claim the practice is not
consistent with the idea of the opportunity for a new beginning
after discharge.36 Arguing that such agreements result in renewed
34. See Gary Klein, Suggestion for the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission and Congress: Eliminate Reaffirmation Agreements, 4 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REv. 528, 529 (1996).
Several years ago, a Congressional report
commented on how such abuse can occur:
Most often in a consumer case, a secured creditor has a security interest
in property that is virtually worthless to anyone but the debtor. The
creditor obtains a security interest in... the debtor's furniture, clothes,
cooking utensils, and other personal effects. These items have little or no
resale value. They do, however, have a high replacement cost. The mere
threat of repossession operates as pressure on the debtor to pay the
secured creditor more than he would receive were he actually to
repossess the goods.
H.R. R. No. 95-595, at 124 (1977).
35. Some consumer advocates charge that some creditors secure reaffirmation
agreements by using the threat of questionable nondischargeability proceedings
against low income debtors, knowing that such debtors cannot afford to contest
such proceedings. See Klein, supra note 34, at 528-29.
36. See id.; see also Steve Miletich, For Many Debtors, It's All in the Cards;
Easy Credit Under Fire as Bankruptcy Soars, SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May
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episodes of credit abuse, they claim that some debtors may even
believe some sort of obligation exists to reaffirm. They also charge
that the reaffirmation process undercuts the policy of equitable
treatment for creditors by allowing Chapter 7 debtors to pick and
choose which creditors they will repay in full. These critics argue
that reaffirmation agreements should be banned from Chapter 7
and instead made part of the Chapter 13 repayment plan process. 31

Supporters of the reaffirmation process deny that reaffirmations benefit one or a few creditors at the expense of the rest.
According to them, "reaffirmations involve post-petition income
which is not property of the estate in a Chapter 7 proceeding, any
argument to deprive one creditor because the rest are not getting a
similar benefit [is asking] that post-petition income should be
property of the estate and be shared by all creditors," which is
beyond the scope of the existing statute."
3. Lack of Monitoring of Debtors in the Consumer
Bankruptcy System-Some observers argue that a variety of

features in the current consumer bankruptcy system detract from
the system's integrity.39 One example is the lack of independent
verification of debtors' ability to pay; specifically, the availability of
discharge in Chapter 7 without examination of a debtor's ability to
repay. Debtors submit financial information in a sworn statement
to the court, but the law does not require auditing or verification of
required submissions. Another example is the problem of serial
filings by the same debtor. Under current law, individuals can file
for bankruptcy every six months, which blocks creditor's debt
collection efforts temporarily due to imposition of the automatic
stay until the case is dismissed, since a discharge can be obtained
only once every six years.

Creditors claim that some debtors

repeatedly file for bankruptcy even though they are not entitled to
a discharge in order to get temporary relief under the automatic
stay.

5, 1997 at A. 1.
37. See sources cited supra note 34.
38. Hearings, supra note 3 at (statement of Donald B. Banks, Director of
Legal Services for Retailers National Bank Dayton Hudson Corporation). In fact
Banks worries that the next step would be to tell debtors how to spend income.
39. See Hearings, supra note 3 at (statement of Dr. Michael E. Staten,
Director, Credit Research Center, Krannert Graduate School of Management,
Purdue University).
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B. Social Factors
Many lenders also blame the rise in bankruptcy filings on
shifting economic and social attitudes towards consumers who file
for bankruptcy. Unlike a generation ago, according to this view,
there is no shame in debt any more; the stigma associated with
bankruptcy has largely disappeared. As a result, unlike previous
decades, today many consumers find it much easier to have credit
extended to them after filing.' For example, many car dealers
advertise the availability of credit to finance cars for bankrupt
debtors, and sub-prime loans and secured credit lines make it easier
to re-establish credit.41 Society's view on bankruptcy has also
shifted; as financial hardship no longer relegates the debtor to the
status of a social outcast.
In recent studies, a bankruptcy consultant to the financial
services industry concluded that the increase in bankruptcy rates
can be tied to four social factors that often lead to financial crisis:
divorce, lack of health insurance, lack of car insurance, and casino
gambling. He suggests that one way to reduce the number of
bankruptcies is to address these social issues, such as by
implementing universal health coverage and enforcing state laws
that mandate drivers to carry automobile insurance.42
C. Economic Factors
As noted above, many critics seem to believe that the
bankruptcy process is the primary culprit behind the recent growth
in bankruptcy filings, and thus argue that fixing the process is the
only real solution to halting this growth. Some commentators have
concluded, however, that the available evidence indicates that such
growth may be attributable merely to increases in the general
population and in the amount of consumer debt in the economy. In
1989, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook released their study of
consumer bankruptcies filed during 1981. 43 In their report, the

40.

See Industry Seeks Resolution to Bankruptcy Dilemma, CREDIT RISK
May 19, 1997, at 1.
41. See Hearings,supra note 3 (statement of American Bankruptcy Institute).
42. See Helen Huntley, Bankruptcy Surge Defies Easy Solutions, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 7, 1997, at 8 (quoting Stuart Feldstein, SMR Research
Corporation).
43. See TERESA SULLIVAN, ET. AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS:
BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA (Oxford University Press
1989).
MGMT. REP.,
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authors found that the overwhelming majority of debtors who filed
for bankruptcy in 1981 were significantly in debt, and only a very
few had any hope of repaying.' Of those who chose Chapter 13,
only a third were able to complete their repayment plans, and many
of these were only to able to make minimal repayments.45 The
authors also found that debtors did not appear to respond predictably to economic incentives created by state law property exemptions; i.e., their results showed that debtors in states with generous
property exemptions filed for bankruptcy and selected chapter 13 in
similar proportions and in about the same economic condition as
those in other states. 4
In 1994, the authors updated their study to review consumer
bankruptcy filings in 1991. 41 In the decade since their first study, the
number of bankruptcy filings had tripled, yet the authors found that
the debtors in 1991 were strikingly similar to those in 1981." "In
other words, the explosion in bankruptcy filings during the ten year
period was not due to more debtors with ability to pay their debts
taking advantage of bankruptcy law's protections, but simply that
there were three times more people with significant debt problems.
They also found that, once again, the generosity of state law
exemptions did not appear to have any effect on the number of
debtors filing for bankruptcy or on the number of debtors who
chose Chapter 7 over Chapter 13. 49 The authors concluded that "as
a result, there may be a need for greater access to the bankruptcy
system, not less."50 They also suggested that one reason for the
increase in the tripling of bankruptcy filings from 1981 to 1991 may
have been due to increasingly aggressive marketing and credit
extension practices by credit card companies to low income debtors
during this period.5

44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id. The results of the 1989 study have been criticized. See Marjorie L.
Girth, The Role of Empirical Data in Developing Bankruptcy Legislation for
Individuals, 65 IND. L. J. 17 (1989); Note, A Reformed Economic Model of
Consumer Bankruptcy, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1338 (1996).
47 See Teresa A. Sullivan, et. al., Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A
FinancialComparison of Consumer Bankrupts 1981-1991, 68 AM. BANK. L. J. 121
(1994).
48. Id. at 124.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 147.
51. Id. at 133 (citing Michael E. Staten, What Caused the Growth in Personal
Bankruptcies: Consumers, Creditors or the Code?, Unnumbered Table, Bank
Card Holdings by income Category (speech to The Visa Bankruptcy Recovery
Program, Annual Conference, Sept 8, 1993)). The authors had previously
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The authors' findings underscore the dilemma faced by the
consumer credit industry as it attempts to persuade Congress to
change the bankruptcy laws: public perceptions that credit card
issuers and other consumer lenders have fueled the consumer debt
crisis by engaging in irresponsible credit underwriting. Some critics
charge that bad debt write-offs are taken into account in computing
the cost of the original credit offer made to consumers, which are
often sent unsolicited. According to these critics, credit card
companies in particular are to blame for the high delinquency rates:
Flooding the market with card offers and placing high interest
rates on cards without promoting responsible spending habits
has contributed to rising delinquency rates, they say. Creditors
first need to reduce their debt exposure. The high interest rates
on cards makes it less important for creditors to make careful
credit decisions. Despite knowledge garnered from credit
bureau reports indicating high [delinquency] rates on multiple
credit cards, issuers continue to extend credit to consumers."
IV. Proposals by the National Bankruptcy Review Commission
The NBRC, composed of nine members appointed by the
President, the Chief Justice, and Congress, was established by
Congress pursuant to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 to
investigate issues relating to bankruptcy, examine the bankruptcy
laws and to prepare a report suggesting proposals to reform and
improve the operation of the bankruptcy process. In the course of
preparing its report, the NBRC undertook a thorough review of the
consumer bankruptcy system, reviewing evidence, holding hearings,
and considering testimony from parties representing a variety of
divergent viewpoints across the bankruptcy spectrum, including
consumer credit counselors, legal scholars, creditors, judges,
trustees, and credit reporting agency representatives.53 The NBRC
suggested that Congress enact legislation that would increase the scope of
governmental regulation of credit extensions to consumer debtors. See TERESA
SULLIVAN, supra note 43, at 324-25.
52. Another 1997 survey concluded that the explosion in bankruptcy filings
was primarily due to aggressive credit card marketing and sloppy credit
underwriting and risk assessment by credit card issuers, who increasingly target

low and moderate income households. See

STEPHEN BROBECK, THE CONSUMER

(Consumer Federation of America
1997).
53. Noting that the number of bankruptcies filed by individual debtors rose
more than 27 percent from 1995 to 1996 and with the expectation that this trend
will continue, Bradley C. Williamson, the chairman of the NBRC, has called
consumer bankruptcy reform "the most challenging and, perhaps, the most
IMPACTS OF EXPANDING CREDIT CARD DEBT
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presented its final report to the President and Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court on October 20, 1997. 54 Rather than substantially
overhauling the fundamental framework of the bankruptcy system,
the NBRC recommendations were designed to fine-tune the
current system to make it fairer and more uniform, and to provide
incentives for debtors to choose to repay their debts under Chapter
13 while preserving their chance for a meaningful fresh start. A
summary of the proposed changes follows:
A. FederalExemptions
One issue the NBRC faced is that under the current system,
debtors and creditors may receive vastly different treatment
depending on the state in which the bankruptcy proceeding was
begun. Nowhere is this disparate treatment more evident than in
the case of assets that the debtor can claim as exempt from
creditors. Under the current system, debtors can claim federal law
exemptions or "opt out" by choosing state law exemptions instead,
although more than thirty states require debtors to use state law
exemptions exclusively. The amount of property that debtors can
claim as exempt can vary widely from state to state - for example,
states like Florida and Texas allow debtors to claim all the equity in
their homestead as exempt, while states like Pennsylvania have no
homestead exemptions. Accordingly, debtors in the former states
are able to keep far more of their property (and unsecured
creditors will be receive less recovery on their claims) than in the
latter states.
The NBRC proposal, which redefined the set of property that
debtors filing for Chapter 7 can claim as exempt, was designed to
enhance the fairness and integrity of the bankruptcy system by
reducing such disparity, yet permit debtors to keep enough assets to
make their fresh start meaningful while providing for fair treatment
of creditors. Specifically, this proposal established a federal floor of
$20,000 and a ceiling of $100,000 on the amount of equity a debtor
may treat as exempt, although states would be allowed to set the
amount of the exemption within this specified range. 5 In addition,
with respect to property of the estate not otherwise exempted by
other provisions, a debtor could retain up to $20,000 in value in any
important subject facing the Commission today."
Hearings, supra note 3
(statement of Brady C. Williamson, Chairman, NBRC).
54. See National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Final Report, available at
http://www.nbrc.gov/report/05acons.html.
55. See id. ch. 1, recommendation 1.2.2.
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form, and debtors who claim no homestead exemptions could
exempt an additional $15,000 of property in any form. 6
B. EncouragingDebtors to File Chapter 13 Rather Than Chapter7
To encourage debtors with sufficient disposable income to
choose Chapter 13 over Chapter 7, thus making more of an attempt
to repay their creditors, the NBRC proposed the following changes:
a. Repayments to unsecured creditors under Chapter 13
would be based on a graduated percentage of the debtor's
adjusted gross income rather than on disposable income
and the disparate percentage of debt, subject to upward
adjustment to meet the Code's requirement that creditors
receive at least the present value of whatever they would
have received in chapter 7.57
b. To encourage debt repayment, debtors who successfully
perform their payment plans under Chapter 13 would
receive more favorable credit reporting than if they had
filed for Chapter 7. Not only would the Chapter 13
bankruptcy be reported for a shorter time period, but the
bankruptcy proceeding would be completely removed
from the debtor's credit records in the event the debtor
repaid all of his debts. 8
c. The preferential treatment granted by the Code under
Section 1322(b) would be changed to apply only to
purchase money mortgages rather than all debt secured by
the debtor's home. As a result, debtors in Chapter 13
could treat other types of loans secured by their home as
any other secured debt, meaning that the payment plan
could reduced the amount of such debts to the home's
value. 9
d. The Chapter 13 "superdischarge" provisions would be
retained.'
C. MonitoringProvisions
To promote the fairness and integrity of the consumer
bankruptcy system, the NBRC proposed the following changes:
56. See id. ch. 1, recommendation 1.2.3.
57. See id. ch. 1, recommendation 1.5.4.
58. See id. ch. 1, recommendation 1.5.8.
59. See National Bankruptcy Review Commission, supra note 54, at ch. 1,
recommendation 1.5.1.
60. See id. ch. 1, recommendation 1.5.7.
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Courts would be authorized to impose sanctions,
specifically any costs and debtor's attorney's fees incurred
in correcting the claims, on creditors who file and fail to
correct materially false claims.61
Trustees in Chapter 7 would be instructed to randomly
audit schedules of information filed by the debtor to
verify the accuracy of the information provided.62
To eliminate serial filings by the same debtor, Chapter 13
cases that otherwise meet the criteria for conversion to
Chapter 7 will instead be dismissed if a party in interest
can show that the debtor had been discharged from a
Chapter 7 case filed within six years from the current
proceeding.63 Also, the automatic stay would not apply to
creditors of an individual debtor who had filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief two or more times within six
years of filing the instant petition for relief, if the most
recent such case was still outstanding within 180 days
prior to the instant case. ' To help track and prevent serial
filings, the NBRC called for a national bankruptcy filing
system to be established that would identify bankruptcy
filings using unique identification numbers (like the
debtor's Social Security number).65

D. Voluntary FinancialEducationfor Debtors
The NBRC proposed that debtors in all Chapter 7 and Chapter
13 cases be given the opportunity to obtain counseling and
participate in financial education programs, and that debtors who
complete such programs have that fact noted on their credit
reports.66 The NBRC received a consensus of opinion that
consumer financial education, such as basic information on credit,
budgeting, and debtor's and creditor's rights, as well as a review of
the bankruptcy process, should be made available to debtors as a
means of deterring future financial problems, ensuring more

61. See id. ch. 1, recommendation 1.1.3.
62. See id. ch. 1, recommendation 1.1.2.
63. See id. ch. 1, recommendation 1.5.5.
64. See id. Under current law, individuals can file for bankruptcy every six
months, which blocks creditor's debt collection efforts temporarily due to
imposition of the automatic stay until the case is dismissed, since a discharge can
be obtained only once every six years.
65. See National Bankruptcy Commission, supra note 54, at ch. 1,
recommendation 1.1.1.
66. See id. ch. 1, recommendations 1.1.5, 1.5.8.
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knowledgeable consumers and less misuse of credit, and pilot
programs for such education on a voluntary basis are being
developed.
E.

ReaffirmationAgreements
The NBRC recommended that reaffirmation

agreements

should only be permitted, with court approval, if certain additional
safeguards to protect the debtor were provided.67

Among the

safeguards suggested by the NBRC were to limit the amount of
debt that could be reaffirmed to the amount of the creditor's
allowed secured claim, and to prohibit attorney fees, costs, and

other creditor expenses from being added to the principal amount
of the debt to be reaffirmed.'
V.

Proposals by the Consumer Credit Industry

The consumer credit industry has advocated a series of
proposals of its own, most of which incorporate the philosophy that
any debtor with the means to do so should be required to file for

Chapter 13 and repay as much debt as possible from disposable
income, while only debtors without sufficient disposable income to
fund a repayment plan being allowed to use Chapter 7.69
Specifically, many consumer lenders have advocated the adoption

of a needs-based bankruptcy system. Under a needs-based system,
debtors obtain only the relief they need from creditors and debt
payment. Persons with some ability to pay (i.e., some disposable

income) would be required to file under Chapter 13, where a three
to five year debt-repayment plan would be structured," while those
without such ability would be allowed to file under Chapter 7.71
Advocates argue that adopting a needs-based approach would limit
67. See id. ch. 1, recommendation 1.3.1.
68. See id.
69. A few creditors are perfectly content with the status quo of consumers
choosing Chapter 7 over Chapter 13. For example, companies that finance
consumer purchases of automobiles typically receive entire repayment in Chapter
7, as debtors tend to reaffirm these debts to keep possession of their cars. In a
Chapter 13 payment plan, however, the amount that the debtor typically repays is
limited to the retail or wholesale value of the automobile. See Kevin T. Higgins,
The Bankruptcy Scourge, CREDIT CARD MGMT., Jan. 1997, at 40.
70. See Miletich, supra note 36, at A.1.
71. According to some proposals, the debtor's ability to pay would be
determined by a gatekeeper, who would examine each debtor's circumstances to
determine the existence of income that could be used for debt repayment. See
Hearings,supra note 3 (statement of Donald B. Banks, Director of Legal Services
for Retailers National Bank Dayton Hudson Corporation).
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the current phenomenon of bankruptcy filing by debtors not
on payments - sometimes referred to as a
seriously delinquent
72
"surprise filing.
Other consumer creditors propose that "means testing" be
used to limit debtor access to Chapter 7. Under this proposal, relief
would be available to debtors, but those who could repay would be
required to make payments. Again, the idea is to lessen the
incidence of unnecessary Chapter 7 filings.73 Issues exist, however,
as to how to determine who could pay and how much. Should
decisions be based on gross income, or income after expenses? As
for expenses, more questions arise 4as to what should be considered
legitimate and necessary expenses.
For the most part, consumer creditors have rejected many of
the NBRC proposals on the basis that these recommendations do
not represent meaningful reform - that debtors who are financially
able to repay at least some of their debt would still be able to use
Chapter 7, rather than being required to file under Chapter 13 and
or all of the
prepare a repayment plan. Many
75 creditors view some
imperative:
as
following reforms
1. Under current law, Chapter 13 plans only have to pay
most secured creditors the value of their collateral, in
which case the debtor may keep the collateral and the
remaining balance of the debt is discharged. Creditors
advocate the law should be changed so that under these
plans either the secured debt must be paid in full or the
collateral promptly surrendered to the creditor.
2. The ability of creditors and debtors to enter into
enforceable reaffirmation agreements in Chapter 7 cases
should not be impaired. The credit card industry in
particular does not favor eliminating reaffirmation
agreements since they have been successful at getting
debtors to reaffirm what would otherwise be
dischargeable unsecured debt, affording a substantial
amount of recovery for the industry.
72. Requiring debtors to file initially for Chapter 13 might not result in as
much recovery as some creditors anticipate, as research shows that less than two
out of every five Chapter 13 plans are ever completed. See Higgins, supra note 69.
73. See Kosterlitz, supra note 1, at 870. For a more complete discussion of
means-testing, see infra notes 80-93 and accompanying text.
74. The number of debtors that would be affected by needs-based bankruptcy
or means testing is subject to debate. Existing surveys reveal different answers,
indicating a need for further research. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Gene Tharpe, Card Issuers Want New Rules for Bankruptcy,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov 1996, at 2E.
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3.

Contrary to the NBRC's proposal, the debtor in Chapter
13 should not receive a discharge until the repayment plan
has been successfully completed, and in the event the
debtor cannot complete the plan, the original debt terms
and amounts should be reinstated. Creditor advocates
charge that discharging debt at the time of filing leaves
debtors with no incentive to complete their repayment
plan.76
4. To ensure that the maximum repayment effort is made; all
consumer debtors should be required to initially file for
Chapter 13 rather than Chapter 7.
5. To discourage consumer abuse of the bankruptcy system,
all debts and cash advances incurred within 90 days prior
to filing should be treated as non-dischargeable debt.
Although currently the Code treats certain cash advances
and purchases of luxury items as non-dischargeable if
incurred within 60 days of filing, the committee believes
that this protection for credit card issuers should be
broadened.
On the other hand, creditors seem to be very much in favor of
the NBRC's proposal that financial education be made available to
debtors who have filed for bankruptcy, the proposed rules against
serial filing, and the new mandatory auditing requirements.
Other than trying to overhaul the consumer bankruptcy
system, there are other strategies consumer creditors have used to
improve their recoveries when their borrowers file for bankruptcy.77 One such approach is through more active participation in
the process, such as attending and questioning the debtor at debtor
examination meetings, investigating and challenging questionable
bankruptcy filings, and aggressively negotiating with debtors to
obtain the maximum recovery possible. Other approaches include
inviting debtors in the early stages of delinquency to financial
education seminars, to try to help them get back on their feet
financially before bankruptcy becomes a viable option.
Similarly, consumer advocates argue that no significant
bankruptcy reform would be necessary if more consumer lenders
76.

See A Bankruptcy-Reform Proposal Could Give the Card Antioch Jitters,

CREDIT CARD NEWS, Apr. 15, 1997, at 1. The chairman of the NBRC argues that

should the debtor fail to complete the Chapter 13 plan, "the creditor can go after
him again (legally reinstate the obligation). [ ]And there will be no re-filing
allowed either,.., so a debtor can't re-file and wipe the debt out." Id. (quoting
Brady C. Williamson, chairman of the NBRC).
77. See Higgins, supra note 69.
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would engage in responsible credit underwriting. According to this
view, credit card issuers in particular have been lax in investigating
prospective customers in their push to gain market share, leading to
higher default rates and more consumer bankruptcies. Some
suggested measures that consumer lenders should take to stem their
losses in bankruptcy include requiring proof of income before
credit is extended and closing dormant accounts. Some even
advocate Congressional intervention if lenders fail to take
corrective action on their own, specifically in areas such as
marketing to vulnerable groups like students and the elderly."
VI. The Congressional Response
House Bill 3150'9 and its companion bill, Senate Bill 1301,' °
were the first pieces of bankruptcy reform legislation to be seriously
considered by Congress following the NBRC report. Rather than
advocating the piece-meal reforms recommended by the NBRC,
however, these bills proposed more significant reforms, particularly
Moreover, these bills
with regard to consumer bankruptcy.
appeared to have been designed more to satisfy the concerns of
consumer creditors rather than debtors, with their overall
objectives being to reduce bankruptcy filings and increase payments
to creditors in bankruptcy.81 In order to achieve these objectives,
both bills (i) suggested capping homestead exemptions under state
law,' (ii) instituted a form of means testing to limit debtor access to
Chapter 7,83 (iii) required random auditing of debtors and other
78. See Huntley, supra note 43, at 8.
79. H. R. 3150, 105th Cong. (1998).
80. S. 1301, 105th Cong. (1998).
81. For an excellent overview of this legislation, see Eugene R. Wedoff, An
Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Provisions of H.R. 3150, available at
http://www.abiworld.org/legis/bills/98julhr3150.html; Eugene R. Wedoff, An
Analysis of S. 1301, availableat http://www.abiworld.org/legis/bills/98julnew1301a
.html. Eugene R. Wedoff is a judge for the United States Bankruptcy Court,
Northern District of Illinois, Chicago, Illinois.
82. Rather than mandating caps on state law homestead exemptions (as did a
prior version of this legislation), the final draft of H.R. 3150 merely expressed the
sense of Congress that homestead exemptions should be capped under state law at
$100,000. See H.R. 3150 § 212. Senate Bill 1301 did mandate such a cap. See S.
1301, § 320.
83. The bills adopted different means-testing criteria in order to achieve this
objective. House bill 3150 set forth certain formulas for income levels to
determine debtor eligibility for bankruptcy relief. Under this proposal, an
individual debtor was deemed to have income available to pay creditors (and is
thus eligible for chapter 13) if he or she had: (1) a current monthly total income of
not less than the highest national median household income reported for a family
of equal or lesser size, or in a one person household, not less than the national

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104:4

debtor monitoring provisions,' and (iv) mandated financial education for debtors.85 Subsequently, both bills were amended to
include additional measures designed to address criticism that these
reform proposals protected consumer creditors at the expense of
the debtor's family. 6
median household income for one earner; (2) projected monthly net income
greater than $50; and (3) projected monthly net income sufficient to repay 20
percent or more of unsecured non-priority claims during a five-year repayment
plan. "Monthly net income" was defined as current monthly total income minus:
(1) expense allowances under specified "Necessary Expenses;" (2) the average
monthly payment on account of secured creditors; and (3) the average monthly
payment on account of priority creditors. See H.R. 3150, § 101.
Under Senate Bill 1301, Chapter 7 cases would have been subjected to
dismissal or conversion if the debtor could pay 20% of his or her general
unsecured claims through a Chapter 13 plan. See S. 1301 § 102.
84. Under both bills, professional audits in accord with generally accepted
auditing standards would have been required in a minimum of 1% of bankruptcy
cases. See H.R. 3150, § 404; S. 1301, § 307. To discourage serial filings, H.R. 3150
extended the mandatory period between discharges in bankruptcy for chapter 7
debtors from six to ten years, and set five years as the mandatory period between
discharges for chapter 13 debt repayment plans, while S. 1301 provided that the
automatic stay would terminate after 30 days in cases of repeated bankruptcy
filings within one year, unless a party in interest demonstrated that the filing of the
later case was in good faith, and (2) that the bankruptcy court have discretion to
enter orders granting relief from the stay "in rem." See H.R. 3150, §171; S.1301, §
303.
Under both bills, a presumption of nondischargeability would have existed for
all debts incurred within 90 days of bankruptcy. See H.R. 3150 §§ 142-43; S. 1301
§§ 314, 316. Both bills also expanded the debtor's disclosure duties when filing for
bankruptcy. For example, the debtor would be required to file with the
bankruptcy court: (1) all tax returns; (2) evidence of payments received; (3)
monthly net income projections; and (4) anticipated debt or expenditure increases.
Chapter 13 debtors would be required to file with the court a statement of income
and expenditures in the preceding tax year, and monthly net income, showing how
calculated. In the event any mandatory information was not timely furnished by a
Chapter 7 debtor, the bills provided for automatic dismissal of the proceeding. See
H.R. 3150, §§ 406-07; S.1301, §§ 301, 312.
85. Both bills required individual debtors in both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13
cases to engage in consumer credit counseling as a condition for eligibility to file,
and indicated that in certain circumstances bankruptcy courts could require
completion of a debtor education program as a condition of discharge. See H.R.
3150, §§ 104, 112; S. 1301, § 321.
86. Specifically, both bills took steps to try to ensure that claims against a
debtor for alimony or child support would be fully recovered. For example, the
definition of nondischargeable debts was expanded to include certain debts to a
spouse, former spouse or child of the debtor that are not in the nature of support
(including those resulting from a property settlement or a hold harmless
agreement). Both bills also predicated court confirmation of a chapter 11, 12, or
13 bankruptcy plan upon the debtor's payment of all amounts payable under a
judicial order for child or spousal support that become due following the date the
bankruptcy petition is filed, and conditioned court discharge of a chapter 12 or 13
debtor upon certification that such debtor has paid all amounts payable under a
judicial order for child or spousal support that are due after the date the
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VIII. House Bill 833

Due

primarily

to

strong

opposition

by

the

Clinton

Administration, H.R. 3150 and S. 1301 were not enacted in the fall

of 1998. Instead, the House of Representatives revised its bankruptcy reform proposal and passed House Bill 833 late in the spring
of 1999.' Like the prior legislation, this bill also appears to have
been designed primarily to address the concerns of consumer

creditors. The bill's most significant features are summarized as
follows:
A.

Uniform FederalExemptions

Although prior legislative proposals would cap homestead
exemptions under state law at $100,000, H.R. 833 does not go so
far. Instead, Section 124 merely requires debtors to reside in a state

for two years (730 days) before they can use the exemption law of
Although Section 147 prohibits debtors from
that state.n
exempting any interest under state law in a residence or burial plot
that exceeds $250,000,89 this limit does not apply to debtors in a
state that has expressly provided by statute that the limit does not
apply to debtors in that state. Instead of mitigating differences
among state exemption laws by capping exemption amounts or
mandating uniform federal exemptions, it appears that H.R. 833
merely aims to discourage debtors from changing states prior to
filing in order to take advantage of more generous exemption laws.
It would also require states that currently allow unlimited

homestead exemptions (such as Texas and Florida) to enact new
legislation which provides that the $250,000 limit does not apply to
debtors who reside in their respective states. 90
bankruptcy petition is filed. Debts for family support obligations was also awarded
the first priority in Chapter 7 distribution, ahead of debts for administrative
expenses in the bankruptcy case. See H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. §§ 145-47 (1998); S.
1301, 105th Cong. §§ 323-26 (1998).
87. See H. R. 833, 106th Cong. (1999). House Bill 833 was passed by the
House of Representatives on May 5, 1999, by a vote of 313 to 108. The Senate
amended portions of Senate Bill 625 into House Bill 833 and passed House Bill
833 by a vote of 83 to 14 on February 2, 2000. As of this writing, there has been no
conference. For an excellent overview of this legislation, see Eugene R. Wedoff,
An Updated Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Provisions of H.R. 833
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 (published by the American Bankruptcy Institute,
available on-line at http://www.abiworld.org/legisIbills/106anal/wedoff833ana820
.html).
88. See H.R. 833, § 124.
89. See id. § 147.
90. Id. at § 147(3).
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Requiring Certain Debtors to File Chapter13 Rather Than
Chapter 7

In order to establish a "needs-based" bankruptcy system for
individual debtors, H.R. 833 precludes individuals from remaining
in a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding if they have current monthly
income available to pay creditors. Specifically, Section 102 of the
bill provides that Chapter 7 cases could be dismissed or (if the
debtor consents) converted to Chapter 13 if the case involves
"abuse" of Chapter 7.9' Such "abuse" would be presumed if the
debtor's current monthly income, after deducting certain expenses,
and multiplied by 60 months, would total more than $6,000. 92 The
expenses to be deducted fall into the following four categories: (i)
estimated administrative expenses and reasonable attorneys' fees,
(ii) the debtor's monthly expenses, (iii) the debtor's average
monthly payments on account of secured debts, and (iv) the
debtor's monthly unsecured priority debt payments.93 The debtor's
monthly expenses are those allowed under IRS collections
standards for the area in which the debtor resides, but do not
include any payments for debts.94 The debtor's average monthly
payment on account of secured debts is to be determined by taking
the total of all amounts due to secured creditors over the next sixty
months, and dividing by sixty.9' Finally, the debtor's monthly
unsecured priority debt payment is to be determined by taking the
total amount of all unsecured priority debts, and dividing by sixty. 96
The debtor may rebut the presumption of abuse and maintain the
Chapter 7 proceeding, but to do so the debtor must show that
"extraordinary circumstances" exist that require either additional
expenses to be included or some other adjustment of current
monthly total income.' The additional expenses or adjustment
must be necessary and reasonable in light of the circumstances, and
their inclusion must result in the debtor's current monthly income
91. Under Section 707(b) of the current bankruptcy statute, "substantial
abuse" is required to dismiss or convert a Chapter 7 case. See supra notes 18-27
and accompanying text.
92. See H.R. 833, § 102(A).
93. Id.
94. Id. Other amounts, such as actual educational expenses of dependent
children under the age of 18 (not to exceed $10,000 per year), and an additional
allowance up to five percent of the food and clothing categories allowed under IRS
collection standards (if reasonable and necessary), may also be included as part of
the debtor's monthly expenses. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.

97. Id. at § 102(a)(2)(B).
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falling below the $6,000 figure cited above. 98 In addition, no motion
to dismiss may be made if the debtor and the debtor's spouse
together have current monthly income equal to or less than the
regional median household monthly income calculated on a
semiannual basis for a household of equal size.'
In order to implement this scheme, the trustee is required to
review the debtor's filing schedules and other materials, and file a
statement within ten days following the first meeting of creditors as
to whether or the proceeding should be presumed to be an abuse of
Chapter 7' ° Copies of the statement are to be provided to all
creditors, along with an explanation of how the formula was applied
in the instant case.'0 ' If the trustee finds that the presumption
should apply, the trustee must file a motion to dismiss or a
statement showing why such a motion should not be filed."°
Although using the concept of "means testing" as a way to
prevent abuse of the Chapter 7 process has been discussed for a
number of years, the approach taken by House Bill 833 appears to
be much too broad, especially since total unsecured debt is not a
factor in determining the debtor's monthly income. As a result of
this omission, a debtor with an extremely large amount of
unsecured debt could be denied access to Chapter 7 if his monthly
net income is barely in excess of the minimum ($100.00 per month).
It is also doubtful that this scheme would thwart debtors who are
truly bent on "abusing" the Chapter 7 process. For example, it
appears that all a debtor has to do to avoid dismissal or conversion
of a Chapter 7 case is delay filing until the total amount of his or
her secured or priority debts have grown to the point that monthly
payments of such debt result in the debtor's current monthly
income (as calculated above) to fall below the $6,000 figure cited
above.
C. DiscouragingConsumer Fraud
To discourage debtors from accumulating large amounts of
consumer debt immediately prior to filing bankruptcy, Section 133
of the bill provides that all consumer debt owed to a single creditor
in excess of $250 that is incurred for cash advances or luxury goods
or services within ninety days prior to bankruptcy is presumed to be
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.

Id. at § 102(a)(2)(D).
Id. at § 102(b)(3).
Id.
Id.
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nondischargeable. 0' 3 A similar provision exists under current law,
but Section 133 is somewhat harsher on debtors, since under
current law the amounts are higher ($500 for luxury goods or
services, and $1,000 for cash advances) and the time period is
shorter (40 days).' °' Also the bill fails to resolve certain problems
that exist under current law: although Section 133 provides that
"luxury goods or services" excludes those reasonably necessary for
the debtor's support or maintenance, no definition of this term is
provided. The bill does not provide any way for the debtor to avoid
the application of the presumption of nondischargeability.
D. Protectionof Creditorswith a Security Interest in Personal
Property

To provide more protection for secured creditors of individual
debtors, Section 122 of H.R. 833 provides that in any type of
bankruptcy proceeding, the entire amount of unpaid debt secured
by personal property purchased by an individual debtor within five
years of bankruptcy would be treated as a secured claim (regardless
of the value of the collateral at the time of filing)."' For debt
secured by personal property purchased more than five years prior
to bankruptcy, Section 123 provides that in Chapter 7 and 13
proceedings, the secured claim would be valued at the retail price of
such property, with no deduction for costs of sale or advertising."
In addition, Section 135 requires Chapter 13 debtors to make
monthly cash payments in the contract amount as adequate
protection to secured creditors who have a purchase money security
interest in personal property, beginning thirty days after filing and
continuing until the debtor's repayment plan has been confirmed."°
The bankruptcy court may, however, change the amount and timing
of these payments after notice and a hearing. 8
Section 119 of the bill provides that in Chapter 7 cases,
individual debtors may not retain possession of personal property
in which a creditor has a valid purchase money security interest
unless, within forty-five days after the first meeting of creditors, the
debtor reaffirms the claim secured by the property, or the debtor
redeems the property from the security interest. 1°9 If no action is
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

See id. § 133.
See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a) (2) (C) (1994).
See H.R. 833, § 122.
See id. § 123.
See id. § 135.
Id.
See id. § 119.
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taken by the debtor within the forty-five day period, the automatic
stay will be terminated as to the property in question, and the
creditor may then take action against it."' The bankruptcy court
may keep the stay in effect, however, if the trustee so requests prior
to the expiration of the forty-five day period, and the court finds
after notice and a hearing that the property is of consequential
value or benefit to the estate, orders appropriate adequate
protection of the creditor's interest, and orders the debtor to
deliver any collateral in the debtor's possession to the trustee."' In
order to provide prompt relief from the automatic stay to secured
creditors, Section 610 also provides that, in bankruptcy proceedings
of individual debtors, the stay will terminate sixty days after a
motion by a party in interest, unless the bankruptcy case is
terminated prior to the end of the sixty days, or the sixty day period
is extended by agreement of all parties in interest or by court order
for good cause." 2
The effect of these changes would be to allow secured creditors
to recover much more than they do under current law, where their
claims are based on the value of the collateral at the time the
debtor files for bankruptcy. These changes also make it much more
likely that debtors will simply surrender the collateral to the
secured party in these situations, since otherwise the debtor would
have to pay the entire amount of the debt (if purchased within five
years preceding bankruptcy), or the retail price or replacement cost
of the property (if purchased more than five years preceding
bankruptcy), in order to keep the collateral, regardless of its current
value. Since these protections would result in greater recoveries for
secured creditors, unsecured creditors accordingly would fare much
worse than they do under current law, particularly in Chapter 13
cases. It also appears that H.R. 833 will protect secured creditors
by allowing them to exercise their rights much more quickly in an
individual bankruptcy proceeding, by providing automatic
termination of the automatic stay within thirty 3to forty-five days,
unless specific action is taken to extend the stay."
E.

Child Support and Alimony Payments

To address criticism that bankruptcy reform legislation
protects consumer creditors at the expense of the debtor's family,
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
See id. § 610.
See id. §§ 119, 120.
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H.R. 833 takes measures to ensure, to the extent possible, that
claims against a debtor for alimony or child support will be fully
recovered. Such claims, whether due before or after the filing of
bankruptcy, are called "domestic support obligations," as provided
in Section 138 of the bill.114 Sections 139 through 144 award first
priority debt status to these obligations, exempt such obligations
from discharge, require payment of such obligations to be current
as a condition for confirmation of a Chapter 11 or 13 plan, and
prevent such payment from being recovered by the trustee as a
voidable preference.115 Further, under Sections 141, 152, and 153,
the automatic stay would not apply to the collection of such
obligations, paternity suits, actions to enforce certain state law
penalties for the failure to pay such obligations, actions to withhold
income for payment of such obligations, child custody actions,
proceedings alleging domestic violence, and divorce actions.16
The most significant changes made by H.R. 833 in this area is
to extend first priority status to domestic support obligations.117
Although such a change seems designed to make the bill more
palatable politically to certain opponents of bankruptcy reform, it
may actually frustrate payment of these obligations. If this change
is enacted, these obligations will be required to be paid in full prior
to any money being made available to pay administrative expenses,
such as the trustee's fees and fees paid to retain professionals to
help recover assets for the estate. In Chapter 7 cases where the
estate is minimal and unpaid domestic support obligations are
substantial, this change would likely result in the refusal of trustees
to administer such cases or reduce recovery efforts. As a result, the
payment of domestic support obligations in bankruptcy would be
stymied.
F. Debtor Monitoring Provisions
Section 602 of House bill 833 would require the U.S. Attorney
General to establish procedures for random audits by independent
licensed public accountants in accord with generally accepted
11 8
auditing standards in at least 0.4% of Chapter 7 and 13 cases.
Such procedures would also require audits of all filing schedules
that show "greater than average variances from the statistical norm
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See id. § 138.
See id. 88 139-44.
See id. §§ 141, 152-53.
Id. § 139.
See H.R. 833, § 602.
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of the district in which the schedules were filed," and the public
reporting of the aggregate results of these audits." 9 Sections 603
and 604 also require Chapter 7 and 13 debtors to include in their
filing schedules copies of all federal tax returns, schedules and
attachments filed within three years prior to bankruptcy, unless
excused by court order.'
Such information would be available for

inspection and copying by any party in interest, although
procedures are to be established to safeguard the confidentiality of
tax information.'2' In the event that this information is not
furnished within forty-five days after the case commences, the bill
provides for automatic dismissal of the proceeding.'
G. Mandatory Credit Counseling and Alternative Dispute
Resolution
Section 302 of the bill provides that any individual debtor
seeking bankruptcy relief would be required to engage in consumer
credit counseling prior to filing bankruptcy. 23 The purpose of such
counseling would be to learn more about credit counseling and to
receive assistance in performing an initial budget analysis. If the
U.S. Trustee determines that no credit counseling services are
available, or if the debtor is unable to obtain such services within
five days after making a request to an approved counselor, this
requirement will not apply.'24 Section 103 also requires the
bankruptcy court clerk to furnish consumer debtors with written
information on a variety of topics prior to commencement of the
1251nf
bankruptcy case.
Such information is to include an overview of
the purposes, benefits and costs of proceeding under the various
bankruptcy chapters, the services available from credit counseling
agencies, and the penalties that can be imposed on debtors who
fraudulently conceal assets or make false statements in connection
with a bankruptcy case.
To encourage the use of alternative dispute resolution of debts
prior to bankruptcy, Section 109 of H.R. 833 authorizes the bankruptcy court, upon motion by the debtor and after a hearing, to
reduce a claim for unsecured consumer debt by up to twenty
percent if the debtor can establish that the creditor had unreason119.
120.

Id.

121.

Id. at § 603.
Id. at § 604.

122.
123.
124.
125.

See id. § 603-04.
See id. § 302.
Id.
See id. § 103.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104:4

ably refused to accept an offer to enter into an alternative
repayment schedule proposed by an approved credit counseling
agency acting on the debtor's behalf.16 For the reduction to be
approved, the offer must have been made within sixty days prior to
the filing of bankruptcy, the alternative repayment schedule must
have provided for at least sixty percent of the debt to be paid over a
reasonable period of time, and no part of the debt may be
nondischargeable, entitled to a priority, or would be paid a greater
percentage in a Chapter 13 than proposed in the alternative
repayment schedule.'27 Section 109 also provides that no transfer by
a debtor to a creditor pursuant to an alternative repayment plan
created by an approved credit counseling agency may be set aside
or avoided by the trustee.
H. FinancialEducation Programsfor Debtors
Section 104 of the bill would require the Director of the
Executive Office for United States Trustees to prepare a program
and materials to educate debtors to better manage their finances,
test and evaluate the program for one year in six judicial districts,
evaluate consumer education programs developed by the consumer
credit industry and other groups, and to submit a report to
Congress on the effectiveness of the curriculum, materials, and
programs within three months after the end of the testing period. 9
Section 302 would deny a discharge to Chapter 7 and Chapter 13
debtors who fail to complete such a personal financial management
program, unless the debtor resides in a district in which such
programs are unavailable.13"
L

Reaffirmation Agreements

In order to curb abusive reaffirmation practices, Section 108 of
H.R. 833 requires that, in addition to other issues to be considered
by a court in evaluating the validity of a reaffirmation agreement,
the court must also be satisfied that the agreement has not been
entered into by the debtor due to improper threats by creditors.'
Additional disclosures must also be made in agreements to reaffirm

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See id. § 109.
See H.R. 833, § 109.
See id.
See id. § 104.
See id. § 302.
See id. § 108.
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unsecured consumer debts. 2 These disclosures would advise the
debtor that he is entitled to a court hearing to determine whether
the reaffirmation of the debt is an undue hardship or is the result of
improper threats by creditors, and that the hearing may be waived
133
in writing signed by a debtor who is represented by counsel.
Section 114 also provides that any individual injured by a creditor's
intentional breach of a reaffirmation agreement may recover either
the amount of the actual damages or $1,000, whichever is greater, as
well as costs and attorneys' fees."3
J.

Addressing Other DebtorAbuses of the Bankruptcy Process

House Bill 833 attempts to discourage bad faith repeat filings
by providing, in Section 117, that the automatic stay is limited to
thirty days in any bankruptcy proceeding filed by or against an
individual debtor within a one-year period following the dismissal
of another bankruptcy case of the same debtor.'
The bankruptcy
court may extend the stay as to any or all creditors after notice and
a hearing within the thirty day period provided that the party
seeking to extend the stay demonstrates that the filing of the latter
proceeding was in good faith.136 In the event that a bankruptcy case
is filed by or against an individual debtor when two or more cases
of the debtor were pending within the prior year but were
dismissed, the automatic stay will not go into effect upon the filing
of that case. 37 Upon the request of any party, the bankruptcy court
must promptly enter an order confirming that no stay is in effect. 8
However, the bankruptcy court may order the stay to take effect as
to any or all creditors after notice and a hearing within thirty days
after the case filing provided that the party seeking to establish the
stay demonstrates that the filing of the latter proceeding was in
good faith. " 9 If the court decides to impose the stay, it must
become effective on the date the order is entered." Section 137
also extends the permissible period between discharges in Chapter
7 bankruptcy from six years to eight years.'
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
Id.
See id. § 114.
See id. § 117.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. § 137.
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IX. Criticisms of Mandatory Means Testing
The Clinton Administration has stated that it could not

support any bankruptcy reform proposal that employed mandatory
means testing to control access to the Chapter 7 bankruptcy
process, as it believes that means testing is "rigid and arbitrary,"

and denies bankruptcy courts the discretion to consider the specific
circumstances of a debtor in bankruptcy.142 Many scholars have also
questioned whether means testing is necessary to restrict access to
bankruptcy. 14 3 Some, like Jean Braucher, argue that it is folly to

think that restricting access to bankruptcy will mean more debts
now discharged will be paid.1"

Although such a proposal would

result in more Chapter 13 filings, the current non-completion rate
in Chapter 13 exceeds sixty percent. By implementing means
testing and restricting access further to Chapter 7, an even higher
failure rate would result. One other practical problem with means

testing involves the cost - who will pay for means testing? If borne
by the debtor in the form of increased filing fees and/or attorney
fees, the plan would disproportionately
affect those who need
14 5

bankruptcy protection most.
Another problem with implementing means testing as a way to

142. According to a policy statement released by the OMB:
The formulaic mechanism in H.R. 3150 will not always distinguish
accurately those debtors who have the capacity to repay from those that
do not have that capacity. A properly structured system would give
bankruptcy courts greater discretion to consider the specific
circumstances of a debtor in bankruptcy. The formulaic approach in this
bill, as currently written, could result in moving to chapter 13 those
debtors who are likely to fail to complete required repayment plans.
These debtors would return to chapter 7 with a diminished ability to
repay their nondischarged debt -including child support and alimony.
Office of Management & Budget, Statement of Administrative Policy, June 10,
1998 (coordinated by OMB with the concerned agencies).
Although the Clinton Administration supports "balanced bankruptcy reform
that would reduce abuses of the bankruptcy system, and would require debtors and
creditors alike to act responsibly," it still would not support H.R. 833 for its
inclusion of mandatory means testing as a way of limiting access to Chapter 7. See
Letter from Jacob J. Lew, Director, Executive Office of the President, Office of
Management and Budget, to Rep. Jerrold Nader, Subcommittee on Commercial
and Administrative Law, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of
Representatives (March 23, 1999) (copy on file with author).
143. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Increasing Uniformity In Consumer Bankruptcy:
Means Testing As A Distraction And The National Bankruptcy Review
Commission's Proposals As A Starting Point, 6 AM. BANK. L. J. 1 (1998); Gary
Klein, Means Tested Bankruptcy: What Would It Mean? 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 711
(1998); Elizabeth Warren, The Bankruptcy Crisis,73 IND. L. J. 1079 (1998).
144. See Braucher, supra note 143, at 8.
145. See id. at 10.
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restrict bankruptcy access is that it would not address what some
see as the true culprit for the boom in bankruptcy filings: a
substantial increase in consumer debt that has been fueled by easy
access to credit granted by consumer lenders. In fact, some argue
that means testing might even lead to even greater growth in credit,
as lenders respond to the increased bankruptcy protection by easing
underwriting standards further."6 These critics point out that debtincome ratios have not changed over the last two decades, so the
increase in bankruptcy filings cannot be attributed to well-off
debtors using bankruptcy as an easy solution. The problem is the
rise in the number of overextended consumers.'47 Accordingly, if
the credit industry is unhappy with the default and bankruptcy rate,
the best solution is to reduce the volume of credit to high-risk
debtors." s
Although no definitive conclusion has been reached, several
recent studies have tested the results of means testing under
proposed legislation. Several of these studies have been financed
by creditors and other proponents of means testing, and others by
organizations that would seem to have no direct financial interest in
the results.' 9 An example of the former, which was funded by
VISA and U.S.A. MasterCard International, both proponents of
means testing, was conducted by Ernst & Young. 5 ° An example of
the latter, which was funded by the American Bankruptcy Institute,
was conducted by two Creighton University professors, Marianne
B. Cuihane and Michaela M. White.''
Both studies purported to examine current means testing
proposals and estimate (i) the percentage of current Chapter 7
debtors that would be required under these proposals to file
Chapter 13 instead, and (ii) the amount of debt such debtors could
be expected to pay over a five-year period. As the General
Accounting Office noted in its review of these studies, both studies

146.
147.
14&
149.

See id. at 8.
See id.
See id. at 6.
For a descriptive summary and analysis of four such studies, see GENERAL

ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY: ANALYSIS OF FOUR REPORTS ON

CHAPTER 7 DEBTORS' ABILITY TO PAY,
GAO REPORT].

150.

GA 1. 13:GGD-99-103 (1999) [hereinafter

See Tom Neubig, et al., ERNST &

PETITIONERS'

REPAYMENT

ABILITY

YOUNG,: CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCY
UNDER
H.R. 833: THE NATIONAL

PERSPECTIVE 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 79 (1999).
151. See Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Taking the New
Consumer Bankruptcy Model for a Test Drive: Means-Testing Real Chapter 7
Debtors, 7 AM. BANK. INST. L. REV. 27 (1999).
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made three assumptions in order to make these determinations.5 2
They assumed that the data listed on the debtors' filing schedules
relating to income, expenses, and debts was accurate, that debtors'
income and living expenses would not change over five years, and
that all debtors required to enter a five-year repayment plan would
complete the plan.153 As the GAO
Report observed, these assump51 4
tions have not been validated.
The Ernst & Yound Study was based on a stratified ramdom
sample of over 2,100 debtors, drawn from Chapter 7 bankruptcy
petitions filed in all federal bankruptcy districts.'55 The Culhane
and White Study used 150 randomly selected Chapter 7 cases from
each of seven federal bankruptcy districts, for a total of 1,050
156
cases.
The Culhane and White Study found that only 3.6 percent of
Chapter 7 debtors could repay their debts over a five year period,57
while the Ernst & Young Study found that 10 percent could repay
within the same period.'
Estimates of the debt that could be
repaid over five years was found to be about $870 million by the
Culhane and White Study and almost $3 billion by the Ernst &
Young Study. 5 9 Although the study results are interesting, it is
hard to determine which (if either) is more accurate, since the
studies used different sampling methods, selected debtors from
different calendar periods, examined different means testing
proposals, screened debtors using different income levels, and
adopted different assumptions to estimate living expenses.
X.

A Modest Proposal: Streamlining the Consumer Bankruptcy
Process

We believe that some bankruptcy reform is warranted due to
the record number of filings since 1978 and the examples of abuse
in the current process cited by both consumer advocates and
creditors. Both the NBRC recommendations and the consumer
creditor-sponsored legislation described above, however, have

152 GAO REPORT, supra note 149, at 3.
153. See also Ernst & Young Study, supra note 150, at 81, 96; Culhane and
White, supra note 151, at 30.
154. See GAO REPORT, supra note 149, at 3.
155. Ernst & Young Study, supra note 150, at 81.
156. Culhane & White, supra note 151, at 73.
157. See Culhane & White, supra note 151, at 31.
158. See Ernst & Young Study, supra note 150, at 81.
159. See CULHANE & WHITE, supra note 151, at 59; Ernst & Young Study,
supra note 150, at 81.
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drawn heavy criticism. We favor an approach that should eliminate

the high transaction costs currently associated with the bankruptcy
process by greatly reducing the need for and the cost of the process
itself.' 6° As described more fully below, such an approach might be
expected to appeal both to debtors and creditors.

Studies have shown that few bankruptcy cases involve
contested matters or sufficient property to warrant the current
judicial process.'

Most consumer bankruptcies are relatively

routine, uncontested matters that usually involve small sums. 162
160. Ninety-five percent of all bankruptcy filings are by consumers, and the
purpose and scope of this article are limited to consumer bankruptcies. Although
a similar proposal might be devised for business bankruptcies (particularly
liquidation proceedings), it might be very problematic to do so for Chapter 11
cases. In Chapter 11, typically many more parties with a much greater variety of
interests are involved (i.e., creditors, creditors' committees, lending institutions,
prospective investors), and much more negotiation is typically involved in drawing
up a reorganization plan than exists in consumer bankruptcies.
161. According to a 1994 report analyzing Chapter 7 cases from 1990-92, the
General Accounting Office (GAO) found that approximately that only five
percent of Chapter 7 cases resulted in the collection and distribution of funds by
the trustees. Fifty-two percent of these cases generated less than $2,500 in receipts
and eighty-eight percent involved less than $25,000 in receipts. Of the total
receipts raised, over twenty-eight percent went to pay fees and expenses, but
general unsecured creditors were only paid about twenty-two percent. See Ed
Flynn, Bankruptcy by the Numbers: General Accounting Office Report on Chapter
7 Cases, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 1994.
162. It has been argued that bankruptcy law addresses what are essentially
administrative issues that are inherently anti-adversarial in nature. Bankruptcy
forces creditors to cooperate by blocking private credit collection efforts and other
litigation against the debtor and consolidating the consideration of claims into a
single forum. Such cooperation, although resisted by creditors in the short term, is
collectively in their long-term best interests. Due to this commonality of interest,
"bankruptcy law ought to be 'anti-adversarial' and amenable to replacement
reform that suspends the right to pursue individual claims in favor of more
cooperative action." Jeb Barnes, Bankrupt Bargain? Bankruptcy Reform and The
Politics of Adversarial Legalism, 13 J. L. & POL. 893 (1997). Even in Chapter 13
cases, which are often an "an exercise in financial planning, nonattorney providers
such as accountants and financial planners, should be allowed to prepare
bankruptcy plans, similar to the way tax advice is currently available." See
McKinley, supra note 4, at 33.
Due to the increasing number of bankruptcy filings, the desire to save the
time and expenses involved in litigation, and the recognition that bankruptcy
matters do not necessarily have to be addressed in an adversarial judicial
environment, more and more bankruptcy courts have begun to require the use of
alternative dispute resolution methods to resolve issues such as lifting the
automatic stay, confirming a plan, fraudulent or preferential transfers, and other
disputes. See Ralph R. Mabey, et.al., Expanding the Reach of Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Bankruptcy: The Legal and Practical Bases for the Use of Mediation
and the Other Forms of ADR, 46 S.C. L. REV. 1259 (1995).
The NBRC has recognized the efficiency in this plan as well. In its report, the
NBRC recommended that Congress authorize the establish-ment of local rules
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Presumably, few procedural safeguards are necessary in such cases
yet, under the current bankruptcy scheme, such cases not only must
follow the formal procedures associated with an adversarial legal
process but must also incur the high cost and delays that are
associated with such a process. We believe that the concerns of
both consumer creditors and debtors would be better addressed by
simplifying bankruptcy law and procedure, particularly in routine
bankruptcy matters. In fact, the purpose of our proposal is to make
the bankruptcy process as simple, inexpensive, and informal as
possible, in order to provide prompt payment to creditors and
timely relief to debtors. Specifically, our proposal is as follows:163
1. Using a judicial system to solve problems that are
essentially administrative in nature has led to
inefficiency.' 6' Accordingly, Congress should abolish the
existing bankruptcy process and establish an independent
agency for processing consumer bankruptcies. As with
many other federal agencies, its decisions would be
appealable first to an appeal board within the agency and
then to the United States Court of Appeals. This agency
should have field offices throughout the United States.
2. An individual seeking debt relief would first meet with a
trained agency representative, who would review financial
information supplied by the debtor and then advise the
debtor of his or her options: whether the debtor should try
to reach a non-bankruptcy settlement with his or her
creditors, file for liquidation under Chapter 7, or seek a
repayment plan under Chapter 13. In the event that the
debtor elects to proceed with bankruptcy, the debtor next
would be referred to an agency analyst, who would be
authorized to determine, according to general guidelines
established by Congress based on the debtor's monthly
income and debt service requirements, whether the debtor

that would enable courts to order non-binding, confidential mediation to resolve
disptes or determine claims in bankruptcy cases.
163. Our proposal is modeled on recommendations made by the Brookings
Institution following its comprehensive study of the bankruptcy process in the late
1960's. See generally DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY:
PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM (Brookings Institution, 1971).

164. See supra notes 161, 162 and accompanying text. Such inefficiency was
also documented by Stanley and Marjorie, who found that over forty cents of
every dollar in the median "asset" case went to administrative costs, which (under
bankruptcy law) were paid prior to the creditors' unsecured claims. See STANLEY
& MARJORIE, supra note 163, at 173-95.
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must file for Chapter 13 rather than seek liquidation
under Chapter 7.
3.

Debtors who desire access to more detailed legal advice
during this process could consult with ombudsmen
furnished by the agency (similar to those used in state

workers' compensation proceedings)."'
4.

Alternatively,

such debtors could always seek advice from counsel of
their choice.
In Chapter 7 cases, the analyst would appraise the
debtor's property, determine the amount of the debtor's

exemptions, and then notify creditors of (1) the filing, (2)
the debtor's exempt property, (3) the expected
distribution, (4) the automatic stay, (5) the anticipated
discharge of the debtor unless written objections are filed
with the agency, and (6) a thirty-day deadline for filing

proofs of claims (which is currently six months under the
Bankruptcy Code). Following the expiration of the thirtyday deadline, unless objections are filed, the analyst would
liquidate the debtor's non-exempt assets, gather the
proceeds, review, determine and allow claims, resolve

discharge questions, if any, and distribute proceeds to
creditors.
5.

If, within the thirty-day period, the debtor objects to the
analyst's decision that the debtor must file for Chapter 13,
or if any creditor objects to the appraisal or to the
debtor's discharge, notice of such objection and the date
and time for a hearing will be sent to each of the parties.

165. From the period 1995 to 1997, approximately sixty percent of workers
filing claims with the Texas Workers' Compensation System used ombudsmen in
the initial review conference. See generally Texas Workers' Compensation System
Data Report, TEXAS WORKERS' COMP. COM., Pub. No. EX97-001, Feb 1998, at 16.
Ombudsmen are available to meet with employees, to investigate complaints as
well as to communicate with employers and insurance carriers to assure that
workers' rights are protected. See id. Only a third of such workers chose to be
represented by an attorney during this process. See id. Only about three percent
of workers go on to contested case hearings, at which approximately fifty percent
of workers utilized ombudsmen, and thirty-five to forty-five percent used
attorneys. See id. Less than one percent of injured workers and a similar
percentage of insurance carriers seek judicial review per year, with only about ten
percent actually resulting in trials per year. See id. These figures indicate the level
of confidence that workers appear to have in ombudsmen as well as the minor role
in the determination of claims played by courts in the workers' compensation
process.
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An agency hearing examiner would then consider and rule
on any such objections. 66
6. To further simplify consumer bankruptcy and expedite
the process, as well as provide more equitable treatment
for debtors and additional recovery for creditors, we
propose replacing the current array of state law
exemptions with a uniform federal exemption (along the
lines of that proposed by the NBRC). We would also
suggest that some thought be given to reducing the
number of priority claims; for example, all such claims
might be claims for wages earned within ninety days prior
to bankruptcy.
7. In Chapter 13 cases, the analyst would propose a plan and
notify creditors of its provisions together with the other
matters outlined in paragraph 4 above. The plan would
be confirmed by the agency unless objected to in writing
by a majority of creditors. In the event of objection, the
hearings examiner would approve the confirmation unless
it was determined that the objecting creditors could not
reasonably expect to receive fair value for their claims.
Following confirmation, the agency would receive funds
from the debtor and distribute them to creditors pursuant
to the plan. Once the plan's payment provisions were
completed, the agency would grant a discharge to the
debtor.
Would such a proposal gain sufficient support in Congress to
be enacted? 16 7 Creditors might be expected to support reform of
this type for a variety of reasons: (i) because much of the
proceeding's administrative costs would be borne by general federal
revenues instead of the debtor's estate, more money remains in the
debtor's estate to pay other unsecured claims, (ii) debtors who have

166. Alternatively, the bankruptcy courts could be used for this purpose, but
this would result in higher costs and longer delays than would using hearing
examiners.
167. The reform legislation arising from the Brookings Study conducted by
Stanley and Girth in the 1970s was rejected by Congress, which ultimately chose
the minor, less drastic reforms included in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
See Claudia MacLachlan, Bankruptcy Bill: Trimmed, Safe and a Crowd Pleaser,
NAT'L L. J., Oct. 24, 1994, at B1. No doubt the lobbying efforts of the legal
profession and bankruptcy judges, who had vested interests in maintaining the
status quo, had a great deal to do with the demise of the Brookings reforms, but at
least one commentator has noted that other obstacles existed as well, including
"American liberalism and distrust of centralized bureaucracy," and "political
uncertainty." See Barnes, supra note 162, at 893, 934.
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sufficient income to support a repayment plan would be required to
file under Chapter 13 rather than under Chapter 7, (iii) legal costs
creditors incur in the current bankruptcy process would also be
reduced, (iv) reducing the number of priority claims would result in
more recovery by unsecured creditors, and (v) replacing the current
array of state law exemptions with a uniform federal exemption
would lead to more uniform, predictable results and perhaps
additional recovery in states with extremely generous exemption
laws.'6 Consumer advocates might also support this proposal as it
provides debtors with financial counseling and debt relief much
more quickly and less expensively than under the current process.169
XI. Conclusion
The proposals being considered currently by Congress seem to
have one element in common: all would increase the cost and
complexity of the bankruptcy process. Even if adoption of these
proposals results in greater recoveries for consumer creditors, the
cost of implementing these reforms, particularly debtor education
and some form of means-testing, would likely offset these gains.
Establishing an administrative process for the bankruptcy process
would more efficiently and effectively utilize economic resources by
reducing the incidence of bankruptcy as well as legal costs when
bankruptcy proceedings are appropriate. In addition, we believe
that the process advocated would adequately address the concerns
and facilitate achievement of most of the stated objectives of
legislators, creditors, and the NBRC. For example, a debtor's
ability to repay his or her debts would be more efficiently and
effectively determined in an administrative setting, on a case-bycase basis by an independent analyst, as opposed to courts applying
arbitrary means-testing requirements in the adversarial climate of
the judicial process. Also, proposals to mandate debtor education,
credit counseling, and the use of alternative dispute resolution as an
alternative to bankruptcy could not only be easily incorporated into
168. Although some creditors would no doubt complain that simplifying the
bankruptcy process might lead to even more bankruptcy filings, such criticism may
be unwarranted under our proposal because debtors with the ability to pay their
debts would have far less incentive to file for bankruptcy than they currently
possess. In any event, the strong possibility that creditors would recover much
more through the bankruptcy process under our proposal should mute such
criticism.
169. This type of legislation might also be quite well-received in the current
political climate, which has sparked the enactment of much recent reform at both
the state and federal levels to simplify and expedite the litigation process,
particularly in the area of torts.
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an administrative process, but arguably may be more effectively
and efficiently performed as part of such a process.
As the tide of personal bankruptcies in the United States
continues to rise, consumer creditors continue to urge Congress to
enact bankruptcy reform. As this article has attempted to show,
there are many factors that contribute to the increase in filings,
most of which are quite unrelated to the structure of the current
bankruptcy system. Although a comprehensive review of this
system led to only minimal reform proposals by the NBRC,
Congress is currently considering at least two proposals that would
impose significant reforms. While these reforms may result in
increased recoveries for consumer creditors, it appears that several
of them (particularly H.R. 833's means testing proposal) would
result in severe hardship for debtors. While such hardships might
be justified if necessary to correct imbalances in the current system,
the available empirical evidence, although mixed, does not appear
to support the contention that such imbalances exist. Accordingly,
Congress (and reform advocates) might look beyond House bill
833, particularly if the objective is to maximize creditor recovery
while at the same time being fair to the debtor. Our proposal
attempts to achieve this goal: by removing the bankruptcy process
from the courts, a more efficient, fairer bankruptcy system would
result, thus serving the best interests of consumer creditors and
debtors.

